provide an empirical analysis of foreign firms that voluntarily delist and deregister from U.S. equity markets. This Internet Appendix contains robustness tests (Tables  IA.II to IA.IX) that accompany the results published in Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2010) . The specific robustness tests provided for each table are described below. In the legend for each table in this appendix, the underlined text in bold indicates how the Internet Appendix table differs from the table reported in the paper. The Internet Appendix also contains the list of firms included / excluded from the sample (Tables IA.X and XI). Note that the table numbers in the Internet Appendix correspond to their analogues in the main text; there is no "Table IA.I" in the Internet Appendix. Table IA .II.a uses a size cutoff of $100 million in total assets instead of a $10 million cutoff. Table  IA .II.b includes 10 firms that announced voluntary delisting, but were at risk of being involuntarily delisted, had previously received a delisting notice from the exchange, or were subject to SEC investigations. That is, even though the firm announced a voluntary delisting, the announcement was likely a preemptive action for an inevitable involuntary delisting. In Table IA .II.c, the standard errors are calculated using two-way clustering on firms and on years. Results for Models (4) and (5) are not reported. In these models, there are fewer years in the regressions because firms are split into pre-Rule 12h-6 and Rule 12h-6 groups -for the Rule 12h-6 group there are only two time periods. Table IA.III  Table IA .III.a uses a size cutoff of $100 million in total assets instead of a $10 million cutoff. Table  IA. III.b includes 10 firms that announced voluntary delisting, but were at risk of being involuntarily delisted, had previously received a delisting notice from the exchange, or were subject to SEC investigations. That is, even though the firm announced a voluntary delisting, the announcement was likely a preemptive action for an inevitable involuntary delisting. In Table IA .III.c, we use value-weighted portfolios instead of equal-weighted portfolios. Table IA.IV  Table IA .IV.a shows abnormal stock-price reactions around the individual SOX announcement dates. Table IA. IV.b uses a size cutoff of $100 million in total assets instead of a $10 million cutoff. Table  IA. IV.c includes 10 firms that announced voluntary delisting, but were at risk of being involuntarily delisted, had previously received a delisting notice from the exchange, or were subject to SEC investigations. That is, even though the firm announced a voluntary delisting, the announcement was likely a preemptive action for an inevitable involuntary delisting. In Table IA .IV.d, R b is an equalweighted portfolio return rather than a value-weighted portfolio return. In Table IA. IV.e, R p is a valueweighted portfolio return rather than an equal-weighted return. In Table IA .IV.f, we define the event windows as in Litvak (2007) . In Table IV , the event dummies are set equal to one (minus one) for the day of the event, the day before the event, and the day after the event for the events that are expected to have a negative (positive) impact. In Table IA .IV.f, we follow the convention used in Litvak (2007) , Table 1 to define the event dummies. For example, for the early SEC announcement on January 17, we set the event dummy to one on January 16, 17, and 18, whereas Litvak sets it to one on January 18. Table IA.V  Table IA .V.a uses a size cutoff of $100 million in total assets instead of a $10 million cutoff. Table  IA .V.b includes 10 firms that announced voluntary delisting, but were at risk of being involuntarily delisted, had previously received a delisting notice from the exchange, or were subject to SEC investigations. That is, even though the firm announced a voluntary delisting, the announcement was likely a preemptive action for an inevitable involuntary delisting. In Table IA .V.c, the CARs are computed relative to an equal-weighted benchmark portfolio instead of a value-weighted benchmark portfolio. Table IA.VI  Table IA .VI.a uses a size cutoff of $100 million in total assets instead of a $10 million cutoff. In Table IA .VI.b, R b is an equal-weighted portfolio return rather than a value-weighted portfolio return. In Table IA .VI.c, R p is a value-weighted portfolio return rather than an equal-weighted return. In Table  IA .VI.d, we define the event windows as in Fernandes, Lel, and Miller (2010) . For example, in Table VI, for the March 21, 2007 event, we set the event dummy equal to one on March 20, 21, and 22, while Fernandes, Lel, and Miller (2010) set the dummy to one on March 21, 22, and 23. Table IA. VI.e considers three additional Rule 12h-6 announcement dates on February 9, 2004 , January 25, 2005 , and March 18, 2005 . Table IA .VII.a uses a size cutoff of $100 million in total assets instead of a $10 million cutoff. In Table IA .VII.b, we substitute the variable "Disclosure" from Djankov et al. (2008) , for the "Anti-selfdealing" variable and in Table IA .VII.c, we substitute the variable "Accounting standards" from La Porta et al. (1998) for the "Anti-self-dealing" variable. In Table IA .VII.d, the CARs are computed relative to an equal-weighted benchmark portfolio instead of a value-weighted benchmark portfolio. In Table IA .VII.e, the CARs are estimated around all three event windows listed in Table VI , rather than just around the March 21, 2007 event date as in Table VII . Finally, in Table IA .VII.f, we use the March 21, 22, and 23 event window as in Fernandes, Lel, and Miller (2010) instead of March 20, 21, and 22 as in Table VII . Table IA.VIII  Table IA .VIII.a uses a size cutoff of $100 million in total assets instead of a $10 million cutoff. Table  IA. VIII.b includes 10 firms that announced voluntary delisting, but were at risk of being involuntarily delisted, had previously received a delisting notice from the exchange, or were subject to SEC investigations. That is, even though the firm announced a voluntary delisting, the announcement was likely a preemptive action for an inevitable involuntary delisting. In Table IA .VIII.c, the CARs are computed relative to equal-weighted benchmark portfolios instead of value-weighted benchmark portfolios. Table IA.IX  Table IA .IX.a uses a size cutoff of $100 million in total assets instead of a $10 million cutoff. Table  IA. IX.b includes 10 firms that announced voluntary delisting, but were at risk of being involuntarily delisted, had previously received a delisting notice from the exchange, or were subject to SEC investigations (two firms do not have complete data and are not included in the regression). In Table  IA .IX.c, the CARs are computed relative to an equal-weighted benchmark portfolio that includes all non-U.S. firms listed in the U.S. via Level 1 OTC or Rule 144a ADRs. In Table IA .IX.d (Table IA. IX.e), the CARs are computed relative to an equal-weighted (value-weighted) benchmark portfolio that includes all non-U.S. firms listed on a U.S. exchange that did not deregister. 
II.a Multi-period Logit Regressions: The Characteristics of Deregistering Firms
The logit models estimate the probability of deregistration in year t, given that the firm has not yet deregistered, over the period from 2002 to 2008. Non-financial firms with at least $100m in total assets are included in the sample. The dependent variable equals one for 130 non-U.S. firms that deregistered from major U.S. exchanges in the year of deregistration (60 firms prior to Rule 12h-6 and 70 firms after Rule 12h-6). After firms deregister they are removed from the data set. Models (1), (2), (3), and (6) include all firms with data on each firm characteristic. Model (4) is estimated over 2002 to 2006 and excludes firms that deregistered after Rule 12h-6. Model (5) is estimated over 2007 to 2008 and excludes firms that deregistered prior to Rule 12h-6. Model (7) (Model (8)) is estimated for firms with a positive (negative) financing deficit. The Rule 12h-6 dummy equals one for firms that deregistered after Rule 12h-6. Other variable definitions are in Table A .I in the paper. All independent variables are lagged by one year. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are adjusted for clustering on firms -they are computed assuming observations are independent across firms, but not within firms. Pseudo-R 2 is a goodness-of-fit measure based on the difference between unrestricted and restricted likelihood functions. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. #, ##, and ### indicate statistical significance for a chi-squared test that tests whether the coefficients are equal between the pre-Rule12h-6 and Rule 12h-6 periods (Models (4) and (5)) or between the positive and negative financing deficit samples (Models (7) and (8)). "Chi-squared" indicates the joint test that all coefficients are equal between pre-Rule 12h-6 and Rule 12h-6 periods (Models (4) and (5)) or between the positive and negative financing deficit samples (Models (7) and (8)).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) The logit models estimate the probability of deregistration in year t, given that the firm has not yet deregistered, over the period from 2002 to 2008. Non-financial firms with at least $10m in total assets are included in the sample. The dependent variable equals one for 130 non-U.S. firms that deregistered from major U.S. exchanges in the year of deregistration (60 firms prior to Rule 12h-6 and 70 firms after Rule 12h-6) plus 10 additional firms that announced voluntary delisting and deregistration, but were at risk of being involuntarily delisted. After firms deregister they are removed from the data set. Models (1), (2), (3), and (6) include all firms with data on each firm characteristic. Model (4) is estimated over 2002 to 2006 and excludes firms that deregistered after Rule 12h-6. Model (5) is estimated over 2007 to 2008 and excludes firms that deregistered prior to Rule 12h-6. Model (7) (Model (8)) is estimated for firms with a positive (negative) financing deficit. The Rule 12h-6 dummy equals one for firms that deregistered after Rule 12h-6. Other variable definitions are in Table A .I in the paper. All independent variables are lagged by one year. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are adjusted for clustering on firms -they are computed assuming observations are independent across firms, but not within firms. Pseudo-R 2 is a goodness-of-fit measure based on the difference between unrestricted and restricted likelihood functions. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. #, ##, and ### indicate statistical significance for a chi-squared test that tests whether the coefficients are equal between the pre-Rule12h-6 and Rule 12h-6 periods (Models (4) and (5)) or between the positive and negative financing deficit samples (Models (7) and (8)). "Chisquared" indicates the joint test that all coefficients are equal between pre-Rule 12h-6 and Rule 12h-6 periods (Models (4) and (5)) or between the positive and negative financing deficit samples (Models (7) and (8)).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) The logit models estimate the probability of deregistration in year t, given that the firm has not yet deregistered, over the period from 2002 to 2008. Non-financial firms with at least $10m in total assets are included in the sample. The dependent variable equals one for 130 non-U.S. firms that deregistered from major U.S. exchanges in the year of deregistration (60 firms prior to Rule 12h-6 and 70 firms after Rule 12h-6). After firms deregister they are removed from the data set. Models (1), (2), (3), and (6) include all firms with data on each firm characteristic. Model (4) is estimated over 2002 to 2006 and excludes firms that deregistered after Rule 12h-6. Model (5) is estimated over 2007 to 2008 and excludes firms that deregistered prior to Rule 12h-6. Model (7) (Model (8)) is estimated for firms with a positive (negative) financing deficit. The Rule 12h-6 dummy equals one for firms that deregistered after Rule 12h-6. Other variable definitions are in Table AI . All independent variables are lagged by one year. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are adjusted for two-way clustering on firms and on years. Results for Models (4) and (5) are not reported because there are only two time periods for the Rule 12h-6 group. Pseudo-R 2 is a goodness-of-fit measure based on the difference between unrestricted and restricted likelihood functions. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. #, ##, and ### indicate statistical significance for a chi-squared test that tests whether the coefficients are equal between the positive and negative financing deficit samples (Models (7) and (8)).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) is the weekly (Friday to Friday) U.S. dollar return on an equal-weighted portfolio of firms that deregistered. R Bench is the return on an equal-weighted portfolio of non-U.S. firms cross-listed on U.S. exchanges that did not deregister. Each portfolio must have at least five firms. R W_exUS is the weekly U.S. dollar-denominated return on the world market portfolio. SMB and HML are the U.S.-based size and book-tomarket factors from Fama and French (1993) . Firms with less than 100 weekly observations, less than $100 million in total assets, and firms that delisted prior to July 8, 2002 are excluded. Deregistering firms are included in the portfolio starting on January 5, 2001 and are excluded from the portfolio starting one week prior to deregistration. The Rule 12h-6 dummy equals one for firms that deregistered after Rule 12h-6. Model (1) includes all deregistering firms and the regression is estimated from January 5, 2001 to June 20, 2008 estimates the regression for the firms that deregistered prior to Rule 12h-6 (over January 5, 2001 to December 1, 2006 . Model (3) estimates the regression for firms that deregistered after Rule 12h-6 (over January 5, 2001 to June 20, 2008 . t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) All deregistering firms Fama and French (1993) . Firms with less than 100 weekly observations, less than $10 million in total assets, and firms that delisted prior to July 8, 2002 are excluded. Deregistering firms are included in the portfolio starting on January 5, 2001 and are excluded from the portfolio starting one week prior to deregistration. The Rule 12h-6 dummy equals one for firms that deregistered after Rule 12h-6. The sample of deregistering firms includes an additional 10 firms that announced voluntary delisting and deregistration, but were at risk of being involuntarily delisted. Model (1) includes all deregistering firms and the regression is estimated from January 5, 2001 to June 27, 2008. Model (2) estimates the regression for the firms that deregistered prior to Rule 12h-6 (over January 5, 2001 to January 5, 2007 . Model (3) estimates the regression for firms that deregistered after Rule 12h-6 (over January 5, 2001 to June 27, 2008 . t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) All deregistering firms Fama and French (1993) . Firms with less than 100 weekly observations, less than $10 million in assets, and firms that delisted prior to July 8, 2002 are excluded. Deregistering firms are included in the portfolio starting on January 5, 2001 and are excluded from the portfolio starting one week prior to deregistration. The Rule 12h-6 dummy equals one for firms that deregistered after Rule 12h-6. Model (1) includes all deregistering firms and the regression is estimated from January 5, 2001 to June 27, 2008. Model (2) estimates the regression for the firms that deregistered prior to Rule 12h-6 (over January 5, 2001 to January 5, 2007 . Model (3) estimates the regression for firms that deregistered after Rule 12h-6 (over January 5, 2001 to June 27, 2008 . t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) All deregistering firms (5) to (7) R p is the difference in returns on the portfolio of deregistering firms (all deregistering firms; deregistering firms prior to Rule 12h-6; deregistering firms after Rule12h-6) and the portfolio of exchange-listed firms that did not deregister (denoted "Dereg-Exch"). R b is the value-weighted return on the benchmark portfolio that includes all non-U.S. firms listed in the U.S. via Level 1 OTC or Rule 144a ADRs. Firms with less than 260 daily observations, firms with less than $10 million in total assets, and firms that delisted prior to July 8, 2002 are excluded. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
( (5) to (7) R p is the difference in returns on the portfolio of deregistering firms (all deregistering firms; deregistering firms prior to Rule 12h-6; deregistering firms after Rule12h-6) and the portfolio of exchange-listed firms that did not deregister (denoted "Dereg-Exch"). R b is the value-weighted return on the benchmark portfolio that includes all non-U.S. firms listed in the U.S. via Level 1 OTC or Rule 144a ADRs. Firms with less than 260 daily observations, firms with less than $100 million in total assets, and firms that delisted prior to July 8, 2002 are excluded. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) All exchangelisted firms (2) All deregistering firms (2007) identifies as important. In Model (1) R p is the daily U.S. dollar equal-weighted return on a portfolio that includes all non-U.S. firms cross-listed on U.S. exchanges. In Model (2) (5) to (7) R p is the difference in returns on the portfolio of deregistering firms (all deregistering firms; deregistering firms prior to Rule 12h-6; deregistering firms after Rule12h-6) and the portfolio of exchange-listed firms that did not deregister (denoted "Dereg-Exch"). R b is the value-weighted return on the benchmark portfolio that includes all non-U.S. firms listed in the U.S. via Level 1 OTC or Rule 144a ADRs. Firms with less than 260 daily observations, firms with less than $10 million in total assets, and firms that delisted prior to July 8, 2002 are excluded. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) All exchangelisted firms (2) All deregistering firms (2007) identifies as important. In Model (1) R p is the daily U.S. dollar equal-weighted return on a portfolio that includes all non-U.S. firms cross-listed on U.S. exchanges. In Model (2) (5) to (7) R p is the difference in returns on the portfolio of deregistering firms (all deregistering firms; deregistering firms prior to Rule 12h-6; deregistering firms after Rule12h-6) and the portfolio of exchange-listed firms that did not deregister (denoted "Dereg-Exch"). R b is the equal-weighted return on the benchmark portfolio that includes all non-U.S. firms listed in the U.S. via Level 1 OTC or Rule 144a ADRs. Firms with less than 260 daily observations, firms with less than $10 million in total assets, and firms that delisted prior to July 8, 2002 are excluded. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) All exchangelisted firms (2) All deregistering firms (2007) identifies as important. In Model (1) R p is the daily U.S. dollar value-weighted return on a portfolio that includes all non-U.S. firms cross-listed on U.S. exchanges. In Model (2) (5) to (7) R p is the difference in returns on the portfolio of deregistering firms (all deregistering firms; deregistering firms prior to Rule 12h-6; deregistering firms after Rule12h-6) and the portfolio of exchange-listed firms that did not deregister (denoted "Dereg-Exch"). R b is the value-weighted return on the benchmark portfolio that includes all non-U.S. firms listed in the U.S. via Level 1 OTC or Rule 144a ADRs. Firms with less than 260 daily observations, firms with less than $10 million in total assets, and firms that delisted prior to July 8, 2002 are excluded. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) All exchangelisted firms (2) All deregistering firms (5) to (7) R p is the difference in returns on the portfolio of deregistering firms (all deregistering firms; deregistering firms prior to Rule 12h-6; deregistering firms after Rule12h-6) and the portfolio of exchange-listed firms that did not deregister (denoted "Dereg-Exch"). R b is the value-weighted return on the benchmark portfolio that includes all non-U.S. firms listed in the U.S. via Level 1 OTC or Rule 144a ADRs. Firms with less than 260 daily observations, firms with less than $10 million in total assets, and firms that delisted prior to July 8, 2002 are excluded. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
( (6)) is estimated for firms with a positive (negative) financing deficit. The Deregistration dummy equals one for firms that subsequently voluntarily deregistered. The Pre-Rule 12h-6 (Rule 12h-6 dummy) equals one for firms that deregistered prior to Rule 12h-6 (after Rule 12h-6). Other variable definitions are in Table A .I in the paper. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are adjusted for clustering on countries -they are computed assuming observations are independent across countries, but not within countries. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The Pre-Rule 12h-6 dummy is not significantly different from the Rule 12h-6 dummy in Model (2). #, ##, and ### indicate statistical significance for a chi-squared test that tests whether the coefficients are equal between the positive and negative financing deficit samples (Models (5) and (6)). "Chi-squared" indicates the joint test that all coefficients are equal between the positive and negative financing deficit samples. (6)) is estimated for firms with a positive (negative) financing deficit. The Deregistration dummy equals one for firms that subsequently voluntarily deregistered plus 10 additional firms that announced voluntary delisting and deregistration, but were at risk of being involuntarily delisted. The Pre-Rule 12h-6 (Rule 12h-6 dummy) equals one for firms that deregistered prior to Rule 12h-6 (after Rule 12h-6). Other variable definitions are in Table A .I in the paper. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are adjusted for clustering on countries -they are computed assuming observations are independent across countries, but not within countries. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The Pre-Rule 12h-6 dummy is not significantly different from the Rule 12h-6 dummy in Model (2). #, ##, and ### indicate statistical significance for a chi-squared test that tests whether the coefficients are equal between the positive and negative financing deficit samples (Models (5) and (6)). "Chi-squared" indicates the joint test that all coefficients are equal between the positive and negative financing deficit samples. (6)) is estimated for firms with a positive (negative) financing deficit. The Deregistration dummy equals one for firms that subsequently voluntarily deregistered. The Pre-Rule 12h-6 (Rule 12h-6 dummy) equals one for firms that deregistered prior to Rule 12h-6 (after Rule 12h-6). Other variable definitions are in Table A .I in the paper. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are adjusted for clustering on countries -they are computed assuming observations are independent across countries, but not within countries. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The Pre-Rule 12h-6 dummy is not significantly different from the Rule 12h-6 dummy in Model (2). #, ##, and ### indicate statistical significance for a chi-squared test that tests whether the coefficients are equal between the positive and negative financing deficit samples (Models (5) and (6)). "Chi-squared" indicates the joint test that all coefficients are equal between the positive and negative financing deficit samples.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Event_Dummy is a vector that includes dummy variables for three announcement dates related to adoption of Rule 12h-6 from www.sec.gov. In Model (1) R p is the daily U.S. dollar equal-weighted return on a portfolio that includes all non-U.S. firms cross-listed on U.S. exchanges. In Model (2) R p is the equal-weighted return on a portfolio of firms that subsequently deregistered using Rule 12h-6 between April 2007 and December 2008. In Model (3) R p is the difference in returns on the portfolio of deregistering firms and the portfolio of exchange-listed firms that did not deregister (denoted "Dereg-Exch"). R b is the value-weighted return on the benchmark portfolio that includes all non-U.S. firms listed in the U.S. via Level 1 OTC or Rule 144a ADRs. Firms with less than 260 daily observations and firms with less than $100 million in total assets are excluded. In Panel A, coefficients are estimated for each dummy variable. In Panel B, a single dummy variable that equals one over all event days is defined. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
( Event_Dummy is a vector that includes dummy variables for three announcement dates related to adoption of Rule 12h-6 from www.sec.gov. In Model (1) R p is the daily U.S. dollar equal-weighted return on a portfolio that includes all non-U.S. firms cross-listed on U.S. exchanges. In Model (2) R p is the equal-weighted return on a portfolio of firms that subsequently deregistered using Rule 12h-6 between April 2007 and December 2008. In Model (3) R p is the difference in returns on the portfolio of deregistering firms and the portfolio of exchange-listed firms that did not deregister (denoted "Dereg-Exch"). R b is the equal-weighted return on the benchmark portfolio that includes all non-U.S. firms listed in the U.S. via Level 1 OTC or Rule 144a ADRs. Firms with less than 260 daily observations and firms with less than $10 million in total assets are excluded. In Panel A, coefficients are estimated for each dummy variable. In Panel B, a single dummy variable that equals one over all event days is defined. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
( Event_Dummy is a vector that includes dummy variables for three announcement dates related to adoption of Rule 12h-6 from www.sec.gov. In Model (1) R p is the daily U.S. dollar value-weighted return on a portfolio that includes all non-U.S. firms cross-listed on U.S. exchanges. In Model (2) R p is the equal-weighted return on a portfolio of firms that subsequently deregistered using Rule 12h-6 between April 2007 and December 2008. In Model (3) R p is the difference in returns on the portfolio of deregistering firms and the portfolio of exchange-listed firms that did not deregister (denoted "Dereg-Exch"). R b is the value-weighted return on the benchmark portfolio that includes all non-U.S. firms listed in the U.S. via Level 1 OTC or Rule 144a ADRs. Firms with less than 260 daily observations and firms with less than $10 million in total assets are excluded. In Panel A, coefficients are estimated for each dummy variable. In Panel B, a single dummy variable that equals one over all event days is defined. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
( is the daily U.S. dollar equal-weighted return on a portfolio that includes all non-U.S. firms crosslisted on U.S. exchanges. In Model (2) R p is the equal-weighted return on a portfolio of firms that subsequently deregistered using Rule 12h-6 between April 2007 and December 2008. In Model (3) R p is the difference in returns on the portfolio of deregistering firms and the portfolio of exchange-listed firms that did not deregister (denoted "Dereg-Exch"). R b is the value-weighted return on the benchmark portfolio that includes all non-U.S. firms listed in the U.S. via Level 1 OTC or Rule 144a ADRs. Firms with less than 260 daily observations and firms with less than $10 million in total assets are excluded. In Panel A, coefficients are estimated for each dummy variable. In Panel B, a single dummy variable that equals one over all event days is defined. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
( Event_Dummy is a vector that includes dummy variables for six announcement dates related to adoption of Rule 12h-6 from www.sec.gov. In Model (1) R p is the daily U.S. dollar equal-weighted return on a portfolio that includes all non-U.S. firms cross-listed on U.S. exchanges. In Model (2) R p is the equal-weighted return on a portfolio of firms that subsequently deregistered using Rule 12h-6 between April 2007 and December 2008. In Model (3) R p is the difference in returns on the portfolio of deregistering firms and the portfolio of exchange-listed firms that did not deregister (denoted "Dereg-Exch"). R b is the value-weighted return on the benchmark portfolio that includes all non-U.S. firms listed in the U.S. via Level 1 OTC or Rule 144a ADRs. Firms with less than 260 daily observations and firms with less than $10 million in total assets are excluded. In Panel A, coefficients are estimated for each dummy variable. In Panel B, a single dummy variable that equals one over all event days is defined. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
( (5) include all firms with data on each firm characteristic. Model (6) (Model (7)) is estimated for firms with a positive (negative) financing deficit. The Rule 12h-6 dummy equals one for firms that deregistered after Rule 12h-6. Other variable definitions are in Table A .I in the paper. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are adjusted for clustering on countries -they are computed assuming observations are independent across countries, but not within countries. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The positive SOX CAR is not significantly different from the negative SOX CAR dummy in Model (4). #, ##, and ### indicate statistical significance for a chi-squared test that tests whether the coefficients are equal between the positive and negative financing deficit samples (Models (6) and (7)). "Chi-squared" indicates the joint test that all coefficients are equal between the positive and negative financing deficit samples.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (5) include all firms with data on each firm characteristic. Model (6) (Model (7)) is estimated for firms with a positive (negative) financing deficit. The Rule 12h-6 dummy equals one for firms that deregistered after Rule 12h-6. Other variable definitions are in Table A .I in the paper. The variable "Disclosure" is used instead of "Anti-self-dealing." The t-statistics (in parentheses) are adjusted for clustering on countries -they are computed assuming observations are independent across countries, but not within countries. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The positive SOX CAR is not significantly different from the negative SOX CAR dummy in Model (4). #, ##, and ### indicate statistical significance for a chi-squared test that tests whether the coefficients are equal between the positive and negative financing deficit samples (Models (6) and (7)). "Chi-squared" indicates the joint test that all coefficients are equal between the positive and negative financing deficit samples.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) to (5) include all firms with data on each firm characteristic. Model (6) (Model (7)) is estimated for firms with a positive (negative) financing deficit. The Rule 12h-6 dummy equals one for firms that deregistered after Rule 12h-6. Other variable definitions are in Table A .I in the paper. The variable "Accounting standards" is used instead of "Anti-self-dealing." The tstatistics (in parentheses) are adjusted for clustering on countries -they are computed assuming observations are independent across countries, but not within countries. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The positive SOX CAR is not significantly different from the negative SOX CAR dummy in Model (4). #, ##, and ### indicate statistical significance for a chi-squared test that tests whether the coefficients are equal between the positive and negative financing deficit samples (Models (6) and (7)). "Chisquared" indicates the joint test that all coefficients are equal between the positive and negative financing deficit samples.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) to (5) include all firms with data on each firm characteristic. Model (6) (Model (7)) is estimated for firms with a positive (negative) financing deficit. The Rule 12h-6 dummy equals one for firms that deregistered after Rule 12h-6. Other variable definitions are in Table A .I in the paper. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are adjusted for clustering on countries -they are computed assuming observations are independent across countries, but not within countries. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The positive SOX CAR is not significantly different from the negative SOX CAR dummy in Model (4). #, ##, and ### indicate statistical significance for a chi-squared test that tests whether the coefficients are equal between the positive and negative financing deficit samples (Models (6) and (7)). "Chi-squared" indicates the joint test that all coefficients are equal between the positive and negative financing deficit samples.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) This table presents (5) include all firms with data on each firm characteristic. Model (6) (Model (7)) is estimated for firms with a positive (negative) financing deficit. The Rule 12h-6 dummy equals one for firms that deregistered after Rule 12h-6. Other variable definitions are in Table A .I in the paper. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are adjusted for clustering on countries -they are computed assuming observations are independent across countries, but not within countries. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The positive SOX CAR is not significantly different from the negative SOX CAR dummy in Model (4). #, ##, and ### indicate statistical significance for a chi-squared test that tests whether the coefficients are equal between the positive and negative financing deficit samples (Models (6) and (7)). "Chi-squared" indicates the joint test that all coefficients are equal between the positive and negative financing deficit samples.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) The sample includes 109 deregistering firms (44 firms prior to Rule 12h-6 and 65 firms after Rule 12h-6) with stock return data in Datastream around the deregistration announcement. Three firms are excluded from the sample because they released other significant news on the same day they announced deregistration. Announcement dates are identified from Lexis-Nexis searches, from SEC filings such as Form 6K, and for firms that deregistered under Rule 12h-6, from Form 15F filings. All returns are in U.S. dollars. Returns are adjusted with a market model using one of two possible benchmark portfolios. The first value-weighted benchmark portfolio includes either all non-U.S. firms cross-listed in the U.S. via Level 1 OTC or Rule 144a ADRs and the second includes all non-U.S. cross-listed on U.S. exchanges that did not deregister. In both portfolios, firms are required to have at least 260 daily observations during the sample period and $100 million in total assets. Market model parameters are estimated over the period from day -244 to -6. CARs are computed over the three-day window (-1, +1) around the announcement date. Significance of average CARs is based on t-statistics that account for cross-sectional dependence as in Brown and Warner (1985) . The binomial test tests whether the percentage of negative CARs is different from 50% (p-value reported). *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. #, ##, and ### indicate that the average CAR for Rule 12h-6 firms is significantly different from the average CAR for firms that deregistered prior to Rule 12h-6. The sample includes 137 deregistering firms (62 firms prior to Rule 12h-6 and 75 firms after Rule 12h-6) with stock return data in Datastream around the deregistration announcement plus 10 additional firms (nine firms before Rule12h-6 and one after) that announced voluntary delisting and deregistration, but were at risk of being involuntarily delisted. Five firms are excluded from the sample because they released other significant news on the same day they announced deregistration. Announcement dates are identified from Lexis-Nexis searches, from SEC filings such as Form 6K, and for firms that deregistered under Rule 12h-6, from Form 15F filings. All returns are in U.S. dollars. Returns are adjusted with a market model using one of two possible benchmark portfolios. The first value-weighted benchmark portfolio includes either all non-U.S. firms cross-listed in the U.S. via Level 1 OTC or Rule 144a ADRs and the second includes all non-U.S. cross-listed on U.S. exchanges that did not deregister. In both portfolios, firms are required to have at least 260 daily observations during the sample period and $10 million in total assets. Market model parameters are estimated over the period from day -244 to -6. CARs are computed over the three-day window (-1, +1) around the announcement date. Significance of average CARs is based on t-statistics that account for cross-sectional dependence as in Brown and Warner (1985) . The binomial test tests whether the percentage of negative CARs is different from 50% (p-value reported). *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. #, ##, and ### indicate that the average CAR for Rule 12h-6 firms is significantly different from the average CAR for firms that deregistered prior to Rule 12h-6. The sample includes 137 deregistering firms (62 firms prior to Rule 12h-6 and 75 firms after Rule 12h-6) with stock return data in Datastream around the deregistration announcement. Five firms are excluded from the sample because they released other significant news on the same day they announced deregistration. Announcement dates are identified from Lexis-Nexis searches, from SEC filings such as Form 6K, and for firms that deregistered under Rule 12h-6, from Form 15F filings. All returns are in U.S. dollars. Returns are adjusted with a market model using one of two possible benchmark portfolios. The first equal-weighted benchmark portfolio includes either all non-U.S. firms cross-listed in the U.S. via Level 1 OTC or Rule 144a ADRs and the second includes all non-U.S. crosslisted on U.S. exchanges that did not deregister. In both portfolios, firms are required to have at least 260 daily observations during the sample period and $10 million in total assets. Market model parameters are estimated over the period from day -244 to -6. CARs are computed over the three-day window (-1, +1) around the announcement date. Significance of average CARs is based on t-statistics that account for cross-sectional dependence as in Brown and Warner (1985) . The binomial test tests whether the percentage of negative CARs is different from 50% (p-value reported). *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. #, ##, and ### indicate that the average CAR for Rule 12h-6 firms is significantly different from the average CAR for firms that deregistered prior to Rule 12h-6. Table VIII , and have complete data on firm characteristics in the year prior to deregistration. Models (1) to (4) and (7) include all deregistering firms with data on each firm characteristic. Model (5) (Model (6)) is estimated for firms that deregistered prior to Rule 12h-6 (after Rule 12h-6). Model (8) (Model (9)) is estimated for firms with a positive (negative) financing deficit. The Rule 12h-6 dummy equals one for firms that deregistered after Rule 12h-6. Other variable definitions are in Table A .I in the paper. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The positive SOX CAR is not significantly different from the negative SOX CAR dummy in Model (4). #, ##, and ### indicate statistical significance for a chi-squared test that tests whether the coefficients are equal between the pre-Rule12h-6 and Rule 12h-6 samples (Models (5) and (6)) or between the positive and negative financing deficit samples (Models (8) and (9)). "Chi-squared" indicates the joint test that all coefficients are equal between the pre-Rule 12h-6 and Rule 12h-6 samples or between the positive and negative financing deficit samples.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) This table presents cross-sectional regressions that examine the impact of firm and country characteristics on cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) estimated around firms' deregistration announcement dates. The CARs are computed relative to a value-weighted benchmark portfolio that includes all non-U.S. firms listed in the U.S. via Level 1 OTC or Rule 144a ADRs. The sample includes 115 non-financial deregistering firms plus eight additional firms that announced voluntary delisting and deregistration, but were at risk of being involuntarily delisted, with at least $10m in total assets, that have deregistration announcement CARS in Table VIII , and have complete data on firm characteristics in the year prior to deregistration. Models (1) to (4) and (7) include all deregistering firms with data on each firm characteristic. Model (5) (Model (6)) is estimated for firms that deregistered prior to Rule 12h-6 (after Rule 12h-6). Model (8) (Model (9)) is estimated for firms with a positive (negative) financing deficit. The Rule 12h-6 dummy equals one for firms that deregistered after Rule 12h-6. Other variable definitions are in Table A .I in the paper. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. ^^ indicates that the positive SOX CAR is significantly different from the negative SOX CAR at the 5% level. #, ##, and ### indicate statistical significance for a chi-squared test that tests whether the coefficients are equal between the pre-Rule12h-6 and Rule 12h-6 samples (Models (5) and (6)) or between the positive and negative financing deficit samples (Models (8) and (9)). "Chi-squared" indicates the joint test that all coefficients are equal between the pre-Rule 12h-6 and Rule 12h-6 samples or between the positive and negative financing deficit samples.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Table VIII , and have complete data on firm characteristics in the year prior to deregistration. Models (1) to (4) and (7) include all deregistering firms with data on each firm characteristic. Model (5) (Model (6)) is estimated for firms that deregistered prior to Rule 12h-6 (after Rule 12h-6). Model (8) (Model (9)) is estimated for firms with a positive (negative) financing deficit. The Rule 12h-6 dummy equals one for firms that deregistered after Rule 12h-6. Other variable definitions are in Table A .I in the paper. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. ^ indicates that the positive SOX CAR is significantly different from the negative SOX CAR at the 10% level. #, ##, and ### indicate statistical significance for a chi-squared test that tests whether the coefficients are equal between the pre-Rule12h-6 and Rule 12h-6 samples (Models (5) and (6)) or between the positive and negative financing deficit samples (Models (8) and (9)). "Chi-squared" indicates the joint test that all coefficients are equal between the pre-Rule 12h-6 and Rule 12h-6 samples or between the positive and negative financing deficit samples.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Table VIII , and have complete data on firm characteristics in the year prior to deregistration. Models (1) to (4) and (7) include all deregistering firms with data on each firm characteristic. Model (5) (Model (6)) is estimated for firms that deregistered prior to Rule 12h-6 (after Rule 12h-6). Model (8) (Model (9)) is estimated for firms with a positive (negative) financing deficit. The Rule 12h-6 dummy equals one for firms that deregistered after Rule 12h-6. Other variable definitions are in Table A .i in the paper. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. ^^ indicates that the positive SOX CAR is significantly different from the negative SOX CAR at the 5% level. #, ##, and ### indicate statistical significance for a chi-squared test that tests whether the coefficients are equal between the pre-Rule12h-6 and Rule 12h-6 samples (Models (5) and (6)) or between the positive and negative financing deficit samples (Models (8) and (9)). "Chi-squared" indicates the joint test that all coefficients are equal between the pre-Rule 12h-6 and Rule 12h-6 samples or between the positive and negative financing deficit samples.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Announced voluntary delisting and there is no direct evidence that NASDAQ was going to delist the firm. However, a news article mentions that the firm's stock price was below $1 and that the firm was in the midst of a major restructuring plan. Grupo Elektra SA de CV Announced voluntary delisting and there is no direct evidence the firm had to leave. However, the firm's controlling shareholder faced charges brought by the SEC and the SEC was considering whether to prohibit the controlling shareholder from managing any publicly traded firms on U.S. markets. Grupo IMSA SA de CV Announced voluntary delisting and there is no direct evidence the firm had to leave. However, the firm's controlling shareholder faced charges brought by the SEC and the SEC was considering whether to prohibit the controlling shareholder from managing any publicly traded firms on U.S. markets. IFCO Systems NV Announced voluntary delisting, but prior to the announcement the firm had received notice from NASDAQ that its shares were subject to delisting as a result of the failure of the bid price of its ordinary shares to close at the minimum $1 per share for the period required under NASDAQ rules. Song Networks Holding AB (formerly Tele1 Europe)
Announced voluntary delisting, but prior to the announcement the firm received warning from NASDAQ that if the value of the firm's depositary receipts did not permanently rise above $1 the firm would be delisted. Announced voluntary delisting, but the announcement coincided with the firm's proposed sale of the majority of its telecommunications equipment and international services businesses. TV Azteca SA de CV Announced voluntary delisting and there is no direct evidence the firm had to leave. However, the firm's controlling shareholder faced charges brought by the SEC and the SEC was considering whether to prohibit the controlling shareholder from managing any publicly traded firms on U.S. markets. Baltimore PLC (formerly Baltimore Technologies) Deregistered after SOX, but delisted prior to SOX; deregistered more than two years after delisting. Cinram Income Fund (formerly Cinram International) Deregistered after SOX, but delisted prior to SOX; deregistered more than two years after delisting. Quebecor Inc Deregistered after SOX, but delisted prior to SOX; deregistered more than two years after delisting. 
